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The more precedents there are, the less occasion is there for law; 
that is to say, the less occasion is there for investigating principles. 
— Dr. Samuel Johnson1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence 
of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the 
 
 †  Associate, Faegre & Benson, LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, and former 
Assistant Minnesota State Public Defender.  Thanks to Susan Andrews, Brad 
Colbert, Michael Cromett, and Cathryn Middlebrook for helpful suggestions, and 
especially to Scott Swanson and Marie Wolf for helpful suggestions and for 
inspiration generally.  The usual disclaimers, including that the opinions 
expressed and mistakes made are all my own, apply. 
 1. JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 615 (1906). 
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character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”2  Despite 
the apparent simplicity of the rule’s prescriptions, the law of other 
bad acts3 evidence in Minnesota is confusing and inconsistent.  
Cases within this body of law are difficult to square with one 
another and often the doctrine articulated within a given opinion is 
itself subject to internal tension. 
In these respects, the Minnesota law of bad acts evidence is not 
unlike many other large bodies of law.4  Whenever a court must 
repeatedly apply the same rules, some aspects of its case law will 
almost inevitably reflect inconsistent results and doctrine.  To some 
extent this may be a product of intent, as judges craft opinions 
based on an understanding of the law not shared by all of their 
colleagues.  It is perhaps more often a result of the practical 
difficulty of obtaining a comprehensive grasp of a large body of law, 
such that no new case is likely to be decided by a court having all—
rather than a select few—of its cases in mind. 
Whatever its causes, the phenomenon ought to be troubling.  
The notion that like cases are to be treated alike is fundamental to 
our justice system.  Inconsistent results mean that like cases have 
not been treated alike and inconsistent doctrine means that 
inconsistent results can nevertheless be consistent with the stated 
law.  The concern is even greater with respect to the criminal 
justice system.  It is particularly important in that context, as the 
Supreme Court has observed, that “justice must satisfy the 
appearance of justice.”5  Where judicial opinions do not 
consistently state the law and cannot consistently apply the law, 
however, that goal is compromised. 
The nature of bad acts evidence is such that the law governing 
 
 2. MINN. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 3. Subsequent references in this article are to “bad acts evidence,” simply 
because “other bad acts evidence”—which I prefer to “other crimes evidence” 
because Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) is not limited to other crimes—is somewhat 
unwieldy.  I avoid the commonly-used “Spreigl evidence” because using the name of 
an old opinion would be incongruous with my arguments. 
 4. See Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial 
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1394 (1995) (noting, in the administrative law 
context, the “tendency for the ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ description of the same 
standard to become increasingly polarized over time, confusing and frustrating 
agencies and litigants as to what is the ‘real standard.’”). 
 5. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). 
2
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its use may be especially susceptible to the development of 
inconsistencies.  Evidence that a defendant has committed another, 
usually similar, crime is obviously relevant to the question of 
whether he committed the crime for which he is on trial.  Just as 
obvious is the tremendous potential for that evidence to unfairly 
prejudice a defendant.  By the time the issue is put before an 
appellate court, however, the evidence will have been admitted and 
the defendant convicted.  It is, as a result, easy to appreciate the 
psychological pull toward affirmance present in nearly every one of 
these cases.  For this very reason, it is critical that the law governing 
the admissibility of bad acts evidence be both certain and 
susceptible to relatively easy and justifiable application.  Such 
clarity not only makes for easier administration of the law by the 
trial courts, but, by effectively precommitting the appellate court, 
also helps to ensure that this psychological pull does not lead to 
results contrary to what more abstract consideration would 
generate.  Stated more simply, it provides greater assurance that 
like cases will, in fact, be treated alike. 
This article argues that because the law relating to bad acts 
evidence in Minnesota suffers from these problems, it needs to be 
thoroughly reconsidered and recast.  The article proceeds as 
follows.  Part II traces the treatment of bad acts evidence by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court during the twentieth century.  That 
history reveals that the law was unsettled, often dramatically so, for 
the entirety of the century and that a number of internal tensions 
and inconsistencies remain.  Part III considers the functions of 
written opinions in our judicial system as well as the doctrine of 
precedent, which is central to those functions.  Part IV considers 
the law of bad acts evidence in light of the material explored in 
Part III.  It concludes that this body of law has reached the point 
where no written opinion can meaningfully fulfill the functions for 
which the device was designed  This article further concludes that 
the only remedy is for the Minnesota Supreme Court to undertake 
a top-to-bottom reconsideration of the law, and in the process, to 
expressly discard all of its pre-existing case law on the subject.6 
 
 6. I do not consider or take any position regarding what the results of such a 
reconsideration ought to be. 
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II. A CENTURY OF BAD ACTS EVIDENCE IN  
THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT 
A.  The First Four Decades 
The century in Minnesota bad acts evidence law opened with a 
pair of bribery cases against members of the Minneapolis police 
force.  The first was State v. Fitchette,7 in which the defendant, a 
captain on the force, was charged with accepting two hundred 
dollars to secure the reappointment of a former policeman.  The 
trial court allowed not only testimony and evidence relating to the 
incident for which Fitchette was on trial, but also testimony 
regarding an incident six months earlier in which he accepted 
money to obtain an appointment for another applicant.  Fitchette 
was convicted and he appealed.  The supreme court opened its 
analysis by noting that the evidence introduced as to the incident 
for which Fitchette was tried “if credited, was sufficient to establish 
every substantive element of the crime for which defendant was 
prosecuted.”8  Yet it concluded that Fitchette was so prejudiced by 
the introduction of the testimony regarding the prior incident that 
he was deprived of a fair trial and reversed the conviction. 
In so doing, the court articulated a strong formulation of the 
general rule against the admission of bad acts evidence.  Because a 
defendant is to be presumed innocent, and because he is entitled 
to be informed of the precise act with which he is charged so that 
he can prepare for trial, 
the proof of independent offenses of the same nature and 
character as the one for which the accused is tried cannot 
be given in evidence as a makeweight against him.  In the 
conduct of a trial in a court of law against a person 
charged with crime the suspicions of the detective or 
interested prosecutor, derived from a minute examination 
of the previous career of the accused, are not to be 
 
 7. 88 Minn. 145, 92 N.W. 527 (1902).  The court decided another bribery 
case involving a Minneapolis police officer on the same day which also presented a 
question relating to the admissibility of bad acts evidence.  State v. Gardiner [sic], 
88 Minn. 130, 92 N.W. 529 (1902) (the case title in the Minnesota Reporter is 
State v. Gardner).  The court reversed that conviction as well and, referring to 
Fitchette, stated, “[i]t is an elementary rule that on the trial of a party for a crime 
evidence that he or others committed another unrelated crime is not relevant.”  
Id. at 144, 92 N.W. at 535. 
 8. Fitchette, 88 Minn. at 147, 92 N.W. at 528. 
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regarded as the legitimate subject of inquiry by the 
tribunal which is to determine the issue of his guilt or 
innocence.  These principles are elementary.  They are 
recognized and declared with unvarying unanimity by 
every reputable text-writer who has referred to the 
subject.9 
To further bolster the point, the court quoted three contemporary 
treatises on evidence in support of this statement of the rule.10 
While emphasizing the strength of the general prohibition, the 
court was careful to note the existence of “well-defined” exceptions, 
such as to “show a distinct hostility, jealousy, or erotic passion;” to 
establish intent in cases where the defendant claims the charged 
act was a mistake; to establish identity where the two acts are “so 
connected or involved” as to relate to one another; and where the 
prior act is “part of a scheme or conspiracy incidental to or 
involved with the one on trial.”11  But, the court emphasized, these 
exceptions to the general prohibition are just that.  As a result, if 
the proposed evidence’s fit within one of these narrow exceptions 
“is not clear in any particular instance, and the trial judge does not 
clearly perceive that the evidence falls within its purview, the 
accused is to be given the benefit of the doubt, and the evidence 
rejected.”12 
The state had alleged that the evidence of the prior incident 
ought to have been admitted against Fitchette because it suggested 
that he was engaged in a system of accepting bribes.  The court 
dismissed this argument, suggesting that it would expand the 
exception to swallow the rule.  “It is said that this charge is very 
similar to others which might be a part of an iniquitous scheme.  
This might be, for this is but little originality in the commission of 
crime.  One bribery, robbery, or larceny is very much like any 
other.”13  Thus, in the court’s view, the evidence presented against 
Fitchette went to the very heart of the prohibition and the 
conviction was reversed. 
Seven months later, the court—whose personnel had not 
changed—issued an opinion with a much different feel.  State v. 
 
 9. Id. at 147, 92 N.W. at 528. 
 10. Id. at 147-48, 92 N.W. at 528 (citing the Jones, Wharton & Underhill 
treatises). 
 11. Id. at 148, 92 N.W. at 528. 
 12. Id. at 148-49, 92 N.W. at 528 (citations omitted) (Minnesota Reporter 
states “is doubtful in any particular instance . . .”). 
 13. Id. at 150, 92 N.W. at 529. 
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Ames14 was also a bribery case.  Ames was the superintendent of the 
Minneapolis police department, charged with receiving a fifteen 
dollar protection payment from a local madam.15  In the state’s 
view, this incident was merely part of a larger undertaking, as the 
court put it, “to put the abandoned women of Minneapolis under 
tribute to him in return for his official protection . . . .”16  The case 
put on against Ames reflected this view.  Witnesses testified that 
Ames visited the brothels of Minneapolis with two of his officers 
and told the proprietors that they could expect to soon begin 
making payments to him, that one of these officers paid a 
subsequent visit accompanied by a local jeweler, and that this pair 
instructed the madams to make payments to the jeweler.  The 
evidence challenged under the doctrine of Fitchette related to 
payments made to the jeweler by other madams.  Ames claimed 
that these were separate crimes and inadmissible pursuant to the 
general prohibition of bad acts evidence.  The court disagreed, 
concluding that the evidence of these acts was inextricably bound 
up in the overall scheme, and thus within one of the approved 
exceptions.17 
For purposes of this article the Ames opinion is striking not for 
its result, which is arguably consistent with the doctrine articulated 
in Fitchette, but rather for the court’s statement of the rule and its 
distancing of itself from the still-fresh opinion in Fitchette.  With 
nearly as much authoritative window-dressing as adorned the 
confident statement of the law in Fitchette, the court articulated a 
vision of a very different regime.  Instead of a broad prohibition 
subject to narrowly-drawn and jealously-guarded exceptions, 
“reduced to its narrowest compass, the true rule is that evidence of 
the commission of other crimes is admissible when it tends 
corroboratively or directly to establish the defendant’s guilt of the 
crime charged in the indictment on trial, or some essential 
ingredient of such offense.”18  This requirement is met when the 
evidence “discloses a motive, a criminal intent, guilty knowledge, 
the absence of mistake, identifies the defendant, or is a part of a 
common scheme or plan embracing two or more crimes so related 
 
 14. 90 Minn. 183, 96 N.W. 330 (1903). 
 15. Id. at 188, 96 N.W. at 331. 
 16. Id. at 193, 96 N.W. at 333. 
 17. Id. at 193, 96 N.W. at 333. 
 18. Id. at 192, 96 N.W. at 333 (emphasis added). 
6
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to each other that the proof of one tends to establish the other.”19  
As for the court’s quite different statement of the law just seven 
months prior: “[w]hat was said in the general discussion of the 
subject in the Fitchette case was not with a view of laying down any 
hard and fast rule in such cases.”20 
For the next dozen years, the court ignored Fitchette and cited 
Ames as having articulated the general rule.  In State v. Peterson the 
court stated the rule as being “that evidence of the commission of 
other crimes by the defendant is competent if it tends, 
corroboratively or directly, to establish his guilt of the crime 
charged in the indictment on trial, or some essential ingredient 
thereof . . . .” 21  Again in State v. Briggs, the court found that 
evidence of other crimes was admissible to establish a plan “to 
commit the crimes for the purpose of plunder and gain” under 
“the rule by which evidence of other crimes is admissible in 
corroboration of the specific charge laid in the indictment.”22 
Not until 1916 did the court find it appropriate to cite Fitchette 
again, taking the position that the “general rule” was that 
articulated in Fitchette, namely “that it cannot be shown that the 
accused has committed other crimes.”23  For a while, it appeared as 
though this might merely have been an aberration.  For at least 
three more years, the court’s opinions continued to reflect the view 
that Ames established the general rule. 
In December of 1918, the court extended the logic of Ames 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. State v. Peterson, 98 Minn. 210, 211, 108 N.W. 6, 7 (1906). 
 22. State v. Briggs, 122 Minn. 493, 500, 142 N.W. 823, 826 (1913).  Two 
months prior to Briggs, the court reversed a conviction in part on the trial court’s 
failure to allow broad evidence of the defendant’s good character.  Citing Ames, 
the court noted that “[e]vidence of good character goes to the probabilities of 
defendant’s guilt, and bears on the general question of guilty or not guilty.”  State 
v. Hutchison, 121 Minn. 405, 408, 141 N.W. 483, 484 (1913). 
 23. State v. Newell, 134 Minn. 384, 386-87, 159 N.W. 829, 830 (1916).  The 
defendant was charged with manslaughter based on her alleged performance of 
an abortion.  Id. at 385, 159 N.W. at 829.  She apparently denied it, though the 
opinion does not describe whether she denied performing any procedure or 
instead denied that the procedure she performed was an abortion.  The court 
nonetheless upheld admission of evidence of defendant’s consent to perform an 
abortion for another person as relevant to establishing intent.  Id.  at 386, 159 
N.W. at 830.  That exception to the general rule, however, typically applies only 
where a defendant does not dispute the act, but instead argues that it was 
committed by accident or mistake.  See 1 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE § 190 (5th ed. 1999). 
7
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nearly as far as it would go in State v. Hartung.24  The defendant in 
that case lived in the small town of Welcome and was sitting outside 
a store in that town when Red Cross volunteers happened by 
soliciting contributions to fund the organization’s assistance of the 
American war effort.  Hartung suggested that they were working for 
the wrong side and that he would not contribute unless the money 
went to Germany.  For this he was charged with and convicted of 
violating a statute prohibiting speech advocating that citizens 
“should not aid or assist the United States in prosecuting or 
carrying on war with the public enemies of the United States.”25  
On cross-examination he was asked about a similar incident which 
occurred four months later, to which his counsel objected.  The 
trial court overruled the objection and the supreme court affirmed.  
Justice Hallam reasoned for the court that “[t]he evidence tended 
to show a continued state of mind and habit of speech.  It showed 
inclination to commit an offense of the character charged, and had 
some tendency to corroborate the evidence of the state’s witnesses 
and to show the guilt of the defendant of the crime charged.”26 
Justice Hallam authorized a similar opinion nine months later 
in State v. Whipple.27  The defendant in that case was a doctor 
charged with the sale of morphine to an addict and the state was 
allowed to introduce evidence of his sales to other addicts.  Though 
the court might easily have justified introduction of the evidence 
under the intent exception to the Fitchette rule,28 it instead cited 
Ames and Hartung for the proposition that such evidence “is 
admissible if it is part of one plan or scheme carried on by 
defendant to willfully violate the law or if it tends to show an 
inclination or predisposition to commit the offense charged.”29 
 
 24. 141 Minn. 207, 169 N.W. 712 (1918). 
 25. 1917 Minn. Laws Ch. 463 § 3. 
 26. Hartung, 141 Minn. at 211, 169 N.W. at 714. 
 27. 143 Minn. 403, 173 N.W. 801 (1919). 
 28. The defendant’s position was that he sold the drug as part of a course of 
treatment for the addiction via “the gradual reduction method.”  In contrast to 
Newell, evidence that he sold morphine to other addicts was likely relevant to 
establishing that his intent in making the sale at issue was impure. 
 29. Whipple, 143 Minn. at 407, 173 N.W. at 802 (citation omitted).  Justice 
Hallam was not finished.  In State v. Clark, 155 Minn. 117, 192 N.W. 737 (1923), he 
wrote the opinion for the court in a case arising out of a conviction for the sale of 
liquor in which it affirmed the admission of evidence of other sales by the 
defendant.  Notably, Justice Hallam did not rely on the Ames formulation of the 
rule, but rather affirmed the conviction on the theory that the sales demonstrated 
“a general system or plan to commit crimes similar to the one charged.”  Id. at 118, 
192 N.W. at 737.  In other words, they fit within one of the exceptions to the 
8
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The Ames formulation of the rule last appeared in the garb of a 
general standard in December, 1920.30  In In re Nash, the court 
stated the rule in the following manner: “[p]roof of other offenses 
of the same nature as the offenses charged, and which tend to show 
that the defendant was pursuing a general scheme or course of 
conduct which embraced the commission of such offenses, is 
admissible for the purposes of corroboration even in criminal 
trials.”31 
Fitchette’s resurgence was taking root even as these last few 
opinions relied on the Ames rule.  In May of 1919, the court in State 
v. Monroe, though affirming the conviction, cited Fitchette in 
acknowledging the “well-established” rule against the admission of 
evidence of other crimes.32  Ames, in contrast, was relegated to a 
string cite supporting the equally well-established exception to the 
general rule for admission of other crimes “which appear to be 
members of a disclosed system.”33  Subsequent cases endorsed this 
formulation.34 
 
Fitchette rule.  Even so, Justice Dibell dissented in a powerfully written opinion.  He 
observed that the evidence presented established no more of a common scheme 
or plan than would any evidence that the defendant had in the past committed 
similar acts.  Id. at 120, 192 N.W. at 738.  Relying on arguments similar to those 
advanced in this article, he argued that if the court disagreed with the general 
rule, it ought to change the rule rather than simply stating without analysis that 
the evidence fit within one of the exceptions.  Id. at 120-22, 192 N.W. at 738-39. 
 30. In re Nash, 147 Minn. 383, 181 N.W. 570 (1920).  The court latched onto 
the Ames formulation again in State v. Upson, 162 Minn. 9, 201 N.W. 913 (1925), 
but not for purposes of admitting evidence of crimes by the defendant.  The 
defendant in that case, a farmer living with his parents, was convicted of selling a 
pint of moonshine.  The dispute on appeal concerned evidence of two sales made 
by his mother.  The court observed that “[e]vidence is neither within nor without 
the ‘rule of exclusion’ simply because it shows other offenses.  The relevancy of 
such evidence is to be determined as is that of any other.  Id. at 15, 201 N.W. at 
915 (citing Ames).  This seems correct, though the opinion did generate a dissent 
by Justice Wilson (though not from Justice Dibell, who dissented in Clark), see 
supra note 29. 
 31. In re Nash, 147 Minn. at 390, 181 N.W. at 573. 
 32. State v. Monroe, 142 Minn. 394, 398, 172 N.W. 313, 315 (1919). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See State v. Friedman, 146 Minn. 373, 378, 178 N.W. 895, 897 (1920).  The 
court endorsed the Monroe discussion, though it appeared to equate Monroe and 
Whipple.  See id.  See also State v. Nelson, 148 Minn. 285, 300, 181 N.W. 850, 856 
(1921) (citing Fitchette in support of the general rule that “[e]vidence of 
independent crimes is generally incompetent,” though one subject to exceptions, 
as stated in Monroe, “which go quite far.”).  Cf. State v. Pugliese, 149 Minn. 126, 182 
N.W. 958 (1921) (citing Monroe and Fitchette as standing for the proposition that 
admission of a separate and independent crime is sound).  
9
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The court finally turned the corner in State v. Friend.35  In that 
case the defendant was charged with statutory rape and the victim 
testified that the defendant told her about a number of other 
underage girls with whom he had also had sex.  The court cited 
Fitchette in support of the proposition that “[e]vidence of other 
crimes is not in general admissible in proof of the crime charged,” 
noted that this case did not fall within any of the exceptions to the 
rule, and further quoted Fitchette in asserting that the testimony 
regarding the asserted prior acts amounted to “makeweight” 
against the defendant.36  The court was not finished.  Perhaps not 
confident that mere reliance on its own caselaw would serve to 
convince that reversal was appropriate, the court canvassed a 
variety of authorities from which it extracted the purpose for the 
rule.  “That evidence of other crimes has probative force is without 
question.  It affects the judgment of the average juror, and of the 
trained legal mind of the lawyer and of the judge accustomed to 
scrutinize and weigh evidence.”37  For that reason, the court 
concluded, the evidence in a criminal trial should generally relate 
only to the specific act with which the defendant is charged.38  Here 
the evidence relating to other acts was of neither the quality nor 
type to overcome this presumption and a new trial was required. 
From that point on, the court never again cited Ames in 
support of a general rule, but rather in support of the proposition 
that the general rule of Fitchette is subject to exceptions.39  Through 
at least the 1930s Fitchette was the leading case on the subject of bad 
acts evidence.40  This did not, however, prevent the court from 
reaching results inconsistent with Fitchette’s rationale.  In State v. 
 
 35. 151 Minn. 138, 186 N.W. 241 (1922). 
 36. Id. at 139-40, 186 N.W. at 241 (Minnesota Reporter quotes as “make-
weight”). 
 37. Id. at 140, 186 N.W. at 242. 
 38. Id. (quoting Paulson v. State, 118 Wis. 89, 94 N.W. 771 (1903)). 
 39. See State v. Drews, 274 Minn. 426, 431, 144 N.W.2d 251, 255 (1966); State 
v. Wofford, 262 Minn. 112, 118, 114 N.W.2d 267, 271 (1962); State v. Glazer, 176 
Minn. 442, 444, 223 N.W. 769, 769-770 (1929); State v. Sabatini, 171 Minn. 137, 
139, 213 N.W. 552, 553 (1927); State v. Eames, 163 Minn. 249, 251-52, 203 N.W. 
769, 770 (1925). See also City of St. Paul v. Greene, 238 Minn. 202, 206, 56 N.W.2d 
423, 426 (1952) (citing Ames in support of the proposition that the court there had 
come “near to following the rule” pursuant to which relevance is the only 
consideration); State v. Clark, 155 Minn. 117, 192 N.W. 737 (1923) (citing Ames in 
support of the proposition that evidence of the crimes of others may be relevant).  
 40. See State v. Yurkiewicz, 212 Minn. 208, 210-11, 3 N.W.2d 775, 776 (1942); 
State v. Stuart, 203 Minn. 301, 306, 281 N.W. 299, 302 (1938); State v. Sweeney, 
180 Minn. 450, 455-56, 231 N.W. 225, 227-28 (1930).  
10
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Voss, for example, the court articulated the governing standard in 
the appropriate manner, but nonetheless concluded that it was not 
error for the district court to have admitted evidence of the stealing 
of barley in a case concerning the theft of hogs.41 
This article is concerned primarily with the court’s statement 
of the applicable rule (rather than whether the rule—whatever it 
is—is an appropriate way of dealing with other bad acts evidence).  
Viewed from that perspective, the first four decades of the 
twentieth century break down into two distinct and nearly separate 
periods.  Though in Fitchette the court opened the century with 
possibly the strongest statement of the rule disfavoring bad acts 
evidence it has ever made, it quickly, and with no change in 
personnel, came back with nearly its strongest statement of the rule 
in the other direction in Ames. 
Following Ames, the court simply ignored Fitchette for over a 
decade.  The general rule favored admission and, under it, the 
court sanctioned results that could not have been justified 
consistent with any faithful adherence to Fitchette.  Some of the 
explanation undoubtedly rests in matters not addressed in the 
opinions, namely the social pressures accompanying World War I 
and Prohibition.  Even so, it is curious that the court did not bother 
to confront Fitchette in any of these opinions.  Instead, the court 
confidently proceeded as if the Ames rule had long been settled and 
needed no reconsideration. 
Fitchette’s reemergence occurred in a similar fashion.  The 
court did not acknowledge, let alone explain, its lengthy absence.  
Nor did the court’s opinions pause to consider that by bringing 
Fitchette to the fore it was implementing a significant jurisprudential 
change of course.  The court went from legal relevance to logical 
relevance and back, the entire time purporting to do nothing more 
than follow precedent.  In this way, the close appearance of Fitchette 
and Ames foreshadowed what was to follow throughout the rest of 
the century. 
B.  The Law at Mid-Century 
Little had changed by 1953, when bad acts evidence was the 
 
 41. 192 Minn. 127, 255 N.W. 843 (1934).  The court offered no analysis, but 
rather a bare conclusion that the evidence was appropriate in connection with 
establishing the defendant’s intent.  Id. at 129, 255 N.W. at 844. 
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subject of a Note published in the Minnesota Law Review.42  
Consistent with the history outlined above, the author suggested 
that the court had to that point in the century been inconsistent in 
both its statement and its application of the law.43  Worse yet, the 
court had simply invented new exceptions where it could not 
plausibly fit the evidence within an existing exception.44  In the 
context of sex crimes, the court appeared to have abandoned the 
rule entirely, a result the author deemed “somewhat illogical.”45  
“Since natural prejudice against the sex offender is so great, it 
would seem that he should be afforded more, rather than less, 
protection.”46  In sum, the Note describes a system in which, though 
the author appears by and large not to find the results of the cases 
he surveyed exceptionable, the law was unsettled and such strict 
adherence to it as might have been possible in the circumstances 
was forsworn where it would lead to undesirable results. 
The occasion of the Note appears to have been the court’s 
decision in City of St. Paul v. Greene.47  The two defendants in that 
case were convicted of selling liquor to minors.  On appeal, they 
challenged the district court’s allowance of evidence that they had 
on other occasions sold liquor to the same minors.  The supreme 
court affirmed the conviction via an opinion heavier on bark than 
bite.  Justice Knutson quoted liberally from a number of the court’s 
past opinions on the subject of bad acts evidence, discussed recent 
scholarly criticism of the general rule excluding such evidence, and 
noted that the court in Ames “came near to following” the 
inclusionary version of the rule.48  Having built up this doctrinal 
conflict, however, he did nothing to resolve it.  Where the reader 
expects a bold proclamation in favor of one standard or the other, 
Justice Knutson instead noted with respect to the evidence before it 
that “it is clear that it is admissible under our decisions.”49 
 
 42. Note, Evidence of Defendant’s Other Crimes: Admissibility in Minnesota, 37 
MINN. L. REV. 608 (1953). 
 43. Id. at 611-13 (noting the court’s failure to consistently place admitted 
evidence within one of the articulated exceptions to the general prohibition) and 
615-16 (noting the court’s failure, on a broader level, to articulate the general rule 
in terms of exclusion or relevance). 
 44. Id. at 615. 
 45. Id. at 614. 
 46. Id. 
 47. 238 Minn. 202, 56 N.W.2d 423 (1952). 
 48. Id. at 203-06, 56 N.W.2d at 425-26. 
 49. Id. at 207, 56 N.W.2d at 426.  Interestingly, three years earlier Justice 
Knutson wrote an opinion for the court in which he stated, without any of the 
12
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Three years later, however, the court in State v. DePauw 
expressly declared its allegiance to “[t]he general and well-
established rule in criminal cases . . . that evidence which in any 
manner shows or tends to show that the accused has committed 
another crime independent of that for which he is on trial is 
inadmissible. . . .” 50  The court adhered to this position more or less 
consistently for the next decade.51 
C.  The Spreigl Era 
Possibly the century’s most important opinion dealing with 
bad acts evidence, at least if status as a shorthand reference to an 
entire body of law is any indication, came in State v. Spreigl.52  
Theodore Spreigl was convicted of “taking indecent liberties” with 
his stepdaughter, based in part on her testimony regarding prior 
instances during the preceding year, coupled with similar testimony 
from another stepdaughter and a stepson.  On appeal, Spreigl 
argued that the trial court ought to have excluded this evidence, or 
at least instructed the jury that it was not to consider the evidence 
as bearing on his guilt or innocence of the charged act.53 
Justice Otis’ opinion for the court is impressive.  Its analytical 
sweep is broad, taking into account both the court’s historical 
treatment of the issue and scholarly commentary on how it ought 
to be dealt with.54  More importantly, the opinion evidences a 
consistent awareness of the rationale for the rule and a struggle to 
square that rationale with both the facts of the case at hand and the 
larger context in which evidence of other bad acts is utilized. 
Still, the opinion is not faultless.  It presents as the “basic issue” 
for resolution as 
 
hesitation apparent in Greene, that “[i]t is a general rule that evidence of separate 
and independent crimes is inadmissible to prove the guilt of a person charged 
with having committed a crime.”  State v. Bock, 229 Minn. 449, 454, 39 N.W.2d 
887, 890 (1949). 
 50. 246 Minn. 91, 93, 74 N.W.2d 297, 299 (1955). 
 51. See, e.g., State v. Wofford, 262 Minn. 112, 117, 114 N.W.2d 267, 271 (1962) 
(“It is well established that evidence that the accused has committed another 
crime unrelated and unconnected with the one for which he is on trial is 
inadmissible since it is not competent to prove one crime by proving another.”); 
State v. Connelly, 249 Minn. 429, 440, 82 N.W.2d 489, 496 (1957) (“It is the 
general rule that evidence of other separate and independent crimes is 
inadmissible in the trial of a defendant charged with a criminal offense.”).  
 52. 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965). 
 53. Id. at 489-90, 139 N.W.2d at 168-69. 
 54. Id. at 490-96, 139 N.W.2d at 169-72. 
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whether the unquestioned relevance of testimony that a 
defendant has committed other sex offenses, if true, gives 
it sufficient probative value to outweigh the patent 
unfairness which results to an innocent defendant who is 
confronted with charges against which he is not prepared 
to defend, which are inflammatory in the extreme, and 
which emanate from witnesses who are manifestly 
susceptible to influence and suggestion.55 
Ultimately, however, the court failed to resolve a number of 
these issues.  While it noted, for example, both its apparent past 
adoption of a presumption that bad acts evidence is more 
appropriate in sex cases because of an implicit assumption that sex 
offenders are more prone to recidivism56 and the existence of 
studies questioning that assumption,57 it ultimately took no position 
on whether a different standard applies in sex cases.58  In similar 
fashion, the opinion dwells on the fact that the witnesses offering 
the testimony were especially susceptible to suggestion and 
improper influence; nevertheless, the opinion does not resolve how 
such situations ought to be addressed.59 
The court did, however, take two important steps toward 
clarifying the law applicable to bad acts evidence.  First, citing to 
Fitchette, it reiterated the rule that the defendant is to be given the 
benefit of the doubt whenever proposed evidence does not clearly 
fall within one of the exceptions to the general rule against 
admissibility.60  This is not an obvious clarification because such a 
presumption was arguably the law all along.  Still, it is a rule of 
potentially great significance if applied consistently and one almost 
 
 55. Id. at 490, 139 N.W.2d at 169. 
 56. Id. at 493, 139 N.W.2d at 170. 
 57. Id. at 493 n.10, 139 N.W.2d at 120 n.10. 
 58. See id. at 488, 139 N.W.2d 167. 
 59. Id. at 494, 139 N.W.2d at 171.  In a continuation of this discussion, the 
court did note that the fact that 
two of the children who claim to have been victims of repeated and 
shocking misconduct over an extended period of time made no 
complaint to their mother nor to anyone else until after the offense for 
which defendant is here charged, and the third child made no complaint 
at any time.  This is something we cannot ignore in weighing the 
question of whether defendant should have a new trial. 
Id.  Though perhaps related in this case, the questions of susceptibility to 
suggestion and whether a sustained failure to object reflects on credibility are 
distinct issues. 
 60. Id. at 495, 139 N.W.2d at 172 (citing State v. Fitchette, 88 Minn. 145, 149, 
92 N.W. 527, 528 (1902)). 
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never mentioned—and therefore, presumably, rarely applied—in 
the cases between Fitchette and Spreigl.  Second, the court adopted a 
notice requirement.61  Specifically, the court articulated a rule 
pursuant to which evidence of other bad acts “shall not hereafter 
be received unless within a reasonable time before trial the state 
furnishes defendant in writing a statement of the offenses it intends 
to show he has committed, described with the particularity 
required of any indictment or information. . . .”62 
Two years later, in State v. Billstrom,63 the court, again speaking 
through Justice Otis, expanded on the rules articulated in Spreigl.  
Although the parties’ arguments were devoted largely to whether 
the proffered bad acts evidence fell within the common scheme or 
plan exception, the court determined that the truly applicable 
exception was that allowing for the introduction of bad acts 
evidence to establish identity.  In so doing, the court set forth six 
procedures to be followed in cases involving bad acts evidence: 
(1) Notice must be given as required by Spreigl; 
(2) The prosecutor must identify, at the time the evidence 
is offered, the exception under which it is being offered; 
(3) Even where the evidence is offered to establish 
identity, “there must nevertheless be some relationship in 
time, location, or modus operandi between the crime 
charged and the other offenses;” 
(4) In cases where the evidence is offered to establish 
identity, it is only admissible where the other evidence 
relating to the perpetrator’s identity is “otherwise weak or 
inadequate;” 
(5) The defendant’s participation in the incidents offered 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence; and 
(6) “Both at the time the evidence is received and in the 
final charge, the court should admonish the jury that the 
testimony is received for the limited purpose of 
establishing identity.”64 
 
 61. Id. at 497, 139 N.W.2d at 173. 
 62. Id. at 497, 139 N.W.2d at 173.  The court adopted three exceptions to the 
notice requirement: “(a) offenses which are part of the immediate episode for 
which the defendant is being tried; (b) offenses for which defendant has 
previously been prosecuted; and (c) offenses which are introduced to rebut 
defendant’s evidence of good character.”  Id. 
 63. 276 Minn. 174, 149 N.W.2d 281 (1967). 
 64. Id. at 178-79, 149 N.W.2d at 284-85.  As an opinion, Billstrom does not 
quite measure up to Spreigl, primarily because it is not at all clear to what extent 
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Despite the fact that Spreigl and Billstrom were plainly intended 
to be opinions that redefined the court’s approach to bad acts 
evidence, the court at first only sporadically regarded them as such.  
Just nine months after Spreigl purported to breathe new life into the 
notion that defendants are to be given the benefit of the doubt 
when the admissibility of bad acts evidence is questionable, the 
court in State v. Sorg65 affirmed the admission of evidence which it 
acknowledged it did not feel “was very strong or convincing so as to 
link defendant” with the charged crime, and did so without making 
any reference to this presumption.66  In State v. Saucedo,67 the court 
chose to rely on State v. Sweeney68 for its statement of the general 
rule and cited Spreigl only in support of the rule it ignored in Sorg.  
Perhaps significantly, each of these opinions had different 
authors.69 
In 1977, the rule gained a more authoritative statement in the 
form of Rule 404(b) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, which 
provides: 
Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible 
to prove the character of a person in order to show action 
in conformity therewith.  It may however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 
of mistake or accident.70 
This rule, while based on and substantively nearly identical to its 
counterpart in the Federal Rules of Evidence,71 was not regarded by 
its drafters as having effected any change to the then-applicable 
doctrine in Minnesota.72  Indeed, the rule was amended after its 
initial adoption to bring it more completely in line with the 
 
the court meant for some of its rules to apply outside the context of the identity 
exception. 
 65. 275 Minn. 1, 144 N.W.2d 783 (1966). 
 66. Id. at 9, 144 N.W.2d at 788. 
 67. 294 Minn. 289, 200 N.W.2d 37 (1972). 
 68. 180 Minn. 450, 231 N.W. 225 (1930). 
 69. Saucedo, 294 Minn. 289, 200 N.W.2d 37 (1972)(MacLaughlin, J., opinion); 
Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 149 N.W.2d 281 (1967)(Otis, J., opinion); Sorg, 275 Minn. 
1, 144 N.W.2d 783 (1966) (Gallagher, J., opinion); Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 
N.W.2d 167 (1965)(Otis, J., opinion).  As noted below, the system by which 
opinion authorship is assigned in the Minnesota Supreme Court may contribute to 
doctrinal tension by placing too much responsibility for any given case with a 
single justice.  See infra note 156. 
 70. MINN. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 71. See MINN. R. EVID. Preliminary Cmt. (2001); FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 72. See MINN. R. EVID. Preliminary Cmt. 
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requirements of the case law.73 
While the adoption of Rule 404(b) put to rest the larger 
question of whether there ought to be any special restriction on the 
admissibility of bad acts evidence, it did not remove all or even 
much of the room for disagreement.  Many of the specific 
procedures adopted in Spreigl and Billstrom were not incorporated 
into the rule.  Moreover, one need only take an expansive view of 
the exceptions enumerated in the rule, which do not even 
comprise an exhaustive list, to end up with something very much 
like the Ames rule.  As the next section discusses, simply by shifting 
the terms of the debate from the now-settled broader question to 
the particulars of the rule’s implementation, the court has come 
near to doing just that. 
D.  The End of the Century 
In the last two decades, the court has rarely departed from 
stating the general rule as one of presumptive exclusion.  It would 
be difficult for it to do so, given that Spreigl’s name has become 
synonymous with bad acts evidence, and the presumption of 
exclusion has been incorporated into Rule 404.  Indeed, some of 
the court’s most recent cases have even stated that the benefit of 
the doubt is to be given to the defendant where it is not clear that 
the proffered evidence fits within one of the exceptions;74 although, 
as discussed below, it is difficult to imagine what effect this has 
given the tremendous discretion that the cases grant to the trial 
courts. 
This is not to suggest that doctrinal consistency reigns 
supreme.  While the stated general presumption has remained 
largely consistent,75 the rules by which it is implemented have not.  
The exceptions have received similar treatment.  Again, there are 
greatly differing formulations of the standards, the most permissive 
of which are, in effect, so broad as to swallow the rule.  Thus, 
although the terms in which it is conducted have changed slightly, 
the unacknowledged debate regarding whether evidence of other 
bad acts is to be presumptively inadmissible continues. 
Because the doctrinal tension has migrated to the lower-order 
 
 73. See MINN. R. EVID. 404 Committee Cmt. (1989). 
 74. E.g., State v. Lynch, 590 N.W.2d 75, 80 (Minn. 1999); State v. Kennedy, 
585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998). 
 75. Cf. State v. Eling, 355 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn. 1984) (discussed at text 
accompanying notes 80-86, infra). 
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questions, and because the number of cases considering bad acts 
evidence has increased dramatically,76 the article shifts focus here 
from an examination of the courts statement and application of the 
general rule to consideration of the case law within a single 
exception, namely evidence of other bad acts relevant to establish 
the perpetrator’s identity.   
Under the traditional view the identity exception is rarely a 
distinct ground for admission.77  The classic instance in which 
another crime would be admissible to establish identity would be a 
so-called “signature” crime, in which common details between the 
prior crime and the one for which the defendant is on trial are so 
distinctive as to make it likely that the two were committed by the 
same person.78  Most often, however, relevance as to identity will be 
incidental to evidence admissible under some other exception, 
such as that for evidence establishing a common scheme or plan.  
Moreover, according to one respected evidence treatise, “courts 
tend to apply stricter standards when the desired inference pertains 
to identity as opposed to state of mind.”79 
At least since Billstrom, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
has applied a looser standard to the admissibility of bad acts 
evidence to show identity than under the other exceptions.  
Despite that general trend, however, as the following cases 
demonstrate, there is presently some confusion in the case law.  
The confusion relates to whether the standard pursuant to which 
bad acts evidence offered to show identity is to be assessed is also 
the same standard to be used to assess the relevance of bad acts 
evidence generally.  Moreover, at least some cases suggest that the 
court has at times viewed this standard as encompassing the 
entirety of the substantive inquiry relating to admissibility.  If this is 
the case, Ames may have returned via the back door. 
1.  State v. Eling 
In State v. Eling,80 the defendant was convicted of first-degree 
 
 76. As of May 18, 2001, Spreigl had been cited in 253 Minnesota appellate 
court opinions. 
 77. See 1 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 668 
(1999). 
 78. See id.; 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 404.22[5][c] (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 
2001). 
 79. See STRONG ET AL., supra note 77, at § 190. 
 80. 355 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. 1984). 
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murder of a security guard during the course of an attempted 
robbery of a hospital pharmacy.  Two informants connected Eling 
to the crime, as did an individual who had helped to plan the crime 
but backed out before its commission.  One of the informants and 
the coconspirator told police that Eling had been shot in the leg, 
which was consistent with blood stains the police had found in the 
getaway van.  Though the opinion does not expressly say as much, 
one infers that Eling was in fact found to have been shot in the leg. 
Eling did not testify.  Instead he relied on the testimony of 
friends and family who stated that he had been with them at the 
time of the robbery.  He also claimed that he had injured his leg 
the day before.  Reasoning that this testimony placed defendant’s 
identity in issue, the trial court allowed the prosecution to present 
evidence relating to two armed robberies of pharmacies committed 
by Eling eight and ten years before.  The three robberies were 
similar in that they involved pharmacies, the defendant was armed, 
pharmacy personnel were ordered to lie on the floor, and a specific 
request was made for “Class A” drugs.  The supreme court affirmed. 
Speaking through Justice Wahl, the court framed its analysis 
with a statement of the rule reminiscent of Ames: “Faced with the 
question of whether prior-crime evidence is admissible, the trial 
court must determine whether the relevance of the evidence is 
sufficient to outweigh its potential for prejudice.”81  Further, 
“[g]enerally, the prosecution must demonstrate a tangible 
similarity between the prior crime and the charged offense in terms 
of time, location, or modus operandi.”82  Although—based on 
Billstrom—this latter statement presumably only relates to bad acts 
evidence proposed to be admitted to establish identity, the opinion 
does not call out that limitation, such that it can be read as 
standing for the proposition that bad acts evidence must be more 
relevant than prejudicial; that relevance is to be judged by 
reference to time, location, or modus operandi; and that nearly all 
the responsibility for making this assessment rests in the trial 
court.83 
Despite the opinion’s somewhat variant statement of the law, 
one can make a colorable, if not entirely convincing, argument that 
these convictions were admissible even under the traditional 
statement of the rule.  That is, in both the two prior robberies of 
 
 81. Id. at 291 (citing State v. Filippi, 335 N.W.2d 739, 743-44 (Minn. 1983)). 
 82. Id. at 292 (citing Filippi, 335 N.W.2d at 743). 
 83. See id. at 291-92. 
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which defendant was convicted and the one at issue, the robbers 
requested “Class A” drugs.  As the court pointed out, a reference to 
“Class A” drugs was, by 1982, anachronistic,84 such that it may have 
had some value as a “signature” aspect of the crime.  Rather than 
focusing on this, however, the court appeared to place at least as 
much reliance on the fact that Eling’s counsel had warned him that 
evidence of these prior convictions would probably be admitted85 
and that, in any event, he had actual notice of the state’s intention 
to introduce the evidence.86  Moreover, the court undertook no 
analysis of the strength of the remainder of the state’s evidence 
relating to identity and made no reference to any of the other 
applicable safeguards.  In sum, the opinion evinces a very 
permissive approach to the admissibility of bad acts evidence. 
2.  State v. DeWald 
In State v. DeWald,87 the court, again speaking through Justice 
Wahl, outlined a very different sort of analysis.  The defendant was 
charged with the murder of an elderly South Minneapolis woman, 
a crime the police had difficulty solving.  Three weeks after the 
murder, however, an elderly man was murdered in South 
Minneapolis and DeWald was connected to that murder.  The 
police then determined that he had been to the murdered 
woman’s house twice roughly a year prior to her death, that a 
fingerprint taken from a faucet in the woman’s house matched his, 
and that he owned a knife of the same brand as the one with which 
she was stabbed.  Arguing that this evidence only weakly tied 
DeWald to the murder, the state requested that it be allowed to 
offer evidence of the man’s murder, which the trial court granted. 
Where Eling did not bother with lengthy summaries of law or 
an analysis tied to precedent at each step, DeWald adopted a more 
formalist air.  Justice Wahl opened the discussion by gravely noting 
that the court recognized that bad acts evidence can lead both 
judge and jury astray.  She recited the general rule against 
 
 84. Id. at 292. 
 85. Id. at 290, 291. 
 86. Id. at 292.  Given that prior notice had long since been required by Spreigl 
and Billstrom, it is difficult to see how this is relevant to the analysis of any 
argument that such evidence should not have been admitted, since if there had 
been no prior notice, the analysis would presumably not need to progress to this 
stage.  See State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 178, 149 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1967); State 
v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 497, 139 N.W.2d 167, 173 (1965). 
 87. 464 N.W.2d 500 (Minn. 1991). 
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admission of the evidence and articulated, at least in broad form, 
the analysis required under Spreigl, including the notion that the 
benefit of the doubt is to be given to the defendant in close cases. 
The trial court had admitted the evidence of the man’s 
murder based on a finding that “it established identity, motive, and 
modus operandi,”88 and the supreme court found that there was 
“no doubt” that the evidence “had probative value on the issues of 
identity and common scheme or plan. . . .”89  Though it 
acknowledged that there were dissimilarities between the two 
offenses, the court cited authority for the proposition that absolute 
similarity is not a prerequisite.90  In considering what the court 
deemed the more difficult question of whether the other crime’s 
unquestioned probative value was outweighed by the potential for 
prejudice, the court likewise sought refuge in citations to authority.  
Thus, it resolved the issue not through a consideration of the 
troubling dynamics of this analysis, but rather through a series of 
syllogisms leading it to the conclusion that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence.91 
3.  State v. Cogshell 
In State v. Cogshell,92 the defendant was convicted of selling 
crack cocaine to an undercover officer.  Because the sale occurred 
during the course of an ongoing investigation, the officer did not 
make an arrest at the time of the sale.  Instead, Cogshell was 
arrested over two months later on the basis of a tip from a 
confidential informant, followed by the undercover officer’s 
 
 88. Id. at 503. 
 89. Id.  It is difficult to characterize the evidence as relevant to motive or 
common scheme or plan/modus operandi as those exceptions are traditionally 
formulated.  Other bad acts are relevant to establish motive only where the 
motivation for the crime in question was directly related to the other crimes 
sought to be proved, as for example would be the case with a crime committed in 
an attempt to cover up earlier crimes.  Common scheme or plan requires a similar 
integral relationship, as where a car is stolen to use as a getaway vehicle for a 
robbery.  See 1 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190 (5th ed. 
1999). 
 90. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d at 503 (citing State v. Filippi, 335 N.W.2d 739, 743 
(Minn. 1983) & State v. Walker, 310 N.W.2d 89, 91 (Minn. 1981)).  The mere fact 
that absolute similarity is not required does not, of course, answer the question of 
why these particular similarities are sufficient, though the court appeared to 
consider that to be self-evident. 
 91. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d at 505. Justice Wahl’s opinion for the court in State v. 
Landin, 472 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1991), has a very similar feel to it. 
 92. 538 N.W.2d 120 (Minn. 1995). 
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identification of Cogshell in a photo lineup.  The trial court 
allowed the state to present evidence of a prior sale of crack by the 
defendant, which occurred fifteen months before the sale at issue, 
and both the court of appeals and the supreme court affirmed. 
Justice Tomljanovich began her analysis of the issue by 
characterizing the principles relating to bad acts evidence as 
consisting of “verbal formulation[s] . . . honed over time” in a body 
of “well-settled” case law.93  Here, the prior conviction was offered 
to establish identity, for which, the court noted, a “signature” 
aspect is not required, but rather “generally there must be some 
relation between the other crimes and the charged offense in terms 
of time, place, or modus operandi.  This means . . . that the mere 
fact that the prior crime was of the same generic type as the 
charged offense (e.g., robbery and robbery) usually isn’t 
sufficient.”94  Here, the court discerned more than just an identity 
of generic types.  “[B]oth offenses occurred in the same general 
area of St. Paul . . . both involved the sale or attempted sale of crack 
cocaine, and . . . the crack cocaine was packaged in the same way in 
both cases.”95  Conceding that the issue was close, and that other 
judges might have ruled the other way, the court nonetheless 
concluded that its admission was appropriate.  This prompted a 
dissent from Justice Gardebring, who, joined by Justice Page, 
reasoned that admission of the prior conviction in this case would 
justify the admission of prior drug activity in the trial of any drug-
related crime.96 
4.  State v. Shannon 
The defendant in State v. Shannon97 was convicted of first-
degree murder in connection with the shooting of a 
developmentally-disabled man who was walking near his home in 
South Minneapolis.  The trial court allowed the state to introduce 
evidence regarding a shooting that occurred a few blocks away and 
five months before, in which the victim was shot in the course of 
being robbed of his marijuana.  The circumstances surrounding 
the shootings suggested that both were gang-related.  The state 
argued that evidence of the first shooting was admissible to 
 
 93. Id. at 123. 
 94. Id. (citation omitted). 
 95. Id. at 124. 
 96. Id. at 124-25 (Gardebring, J., dissenting). 
 97. 583 N.W.2d 579 (Minn. 1998). 
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establish identity or common scheme or plan.  The supreme court 
disagreed and reversed. 
Justice Gardebring’s opinion for the court purported to 
canvass the relevant authority, including a detailed list of the 
Billstrom procedural rules applicable to bad acts evidence.  
Operating under a legal framework largely consistent with the 
Spreigl/Billstrom approach, the court concluded that the evidence 
should not have been admitted because the prosecution had not 
established Shannon’s participation in the prior incident by clear 
and convincing evidence.  Moreover, the court found, there was 
not enough commonality between the two events, which were 
similar only in that they “occurred in roughly the same 
neighborhood within some five months of each other, that both 
were shootings, and that they involved handguns.”98  Finally, the 
court concluded that the error was not harmless and that a new 
trial was required.  Justice Gilbert, joined by Justice Page, dissented, 
asserting that the evidence was properly admitted because it 
established “the common scheme or plan of gang dominance and 
enforcement in this particular neighborhood of South 
Minneapolis.”99 
5.  Can They Be Reconciled? 
It is difficult to extract a consistent approach from these cases.  
Eling’s discussion of the law is brief and indicative of a permissive 
approach, while DeWald and Shannon are more ponderous and 
acknowledge the presumption against admissibility, Cogshell treads a 
middle ground in what it characterizes as a well-settled body of law.  
Thus, despite Rule 404(b)—which generally receives less focused 
attention than one would expect of a governing rule—there 
remains at least some level of instability in the general standard 
itself. 
The uncertainties and inconsistencies are more apparent when 
viewed at the next level of doctrine.  No clear test for determining 
whether evidence relates to identity emerges from these cases.  In 
an opinion issued seven months after DeWald, Justice Wahl cited it 
for the proposition that bad acts evidence offered to establish 
identity “must be similar to the charged offense either in time, 
 
 98. Id. at 585. 
 99. Id. at 586 (Gilbert, J., dissenting). 
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location, or modus operandi.”100  Though DeWald used that phrase, 
it did so not in the context of articulating the contours of the 
identity exception to the general rule, but rather to state the 
standard used to determine whether bad acts evidence, once within 
an exception to the rule of exclusion, is relevant.101  Ultimately the 
formulation can be traced to Billstrom.102  As introduced there, 
however, it appears not to have been intended as the general test 
for determining whether evidence falls within the identity 
exception, but rather to establish the point that though such 
evidence, when introduced to establish identity, need not meet all 
the requirements necessary for admission under the common 
scheme or plan exception, it must still possess some of those 
attributes.  In other words, these are attributes that identity-related 
evidence must possess to be admissible, rather than being the 
definition of such evidence.  Billstrom, then, appears to contemplate 
retention of the two-step process pursuant to which a court must 
first determine which, if any, exception the proffered evidence falls 
under and then determine whether the evidence is admissible.  
These later cases, however, appear to reduce that inquiry to just the 
second step. 
The use of the “time, location, or modus operandi” language 
as the general test for relevance can be traced to State v. Filippi,103 
where it was used not in the context of the court intentionally 
creating a rule, but rather as a doubly-qualified distillation of its 
past cases.  “In determining relevancy, we have generally required 
that the other crime be similar in some way—either in time, 
location, or modus operandi—to the charged offense, although this, 
of course, is not an absolute necessity.”104  Cases such as Cogshell, 
however, suggest an analysis in which this relevance test is the 
featured inquiry with respect to the admission of any bad acts 
evidence. 105  Taken at face value, these opinions suggest a regime 
 
 100. State v. Landin, 472 N.W.2d 854, 859 (Minn. 1991) (citing State v. 
DeWald, 464 N.W.2d 500, 503 (Minn. 1991)). 
 101. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d at 503. 
 102. 276 Minn. 174, 178, 149 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1967). 
 103. 335 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. 1983). 
 104. Id. at 743 (emphasis added). 
 105. Even Justice Gardebring’s dissent in Cogshell views the Filippi relevance test 
as the only test applicable to the admissibility of bad acts evidence to establish 
identity.  State v. Cogshell, 538 N.W.2d 120, 125 (Minn. 1995) (Gardebring, J., 
dissenting).  Another such opinion is State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191 (Minn. 1995), 
in which the court purported to restate the state of the art in bad acts evidence 
law: “Because of the potential for substantial prejudice to the defendant’s case 
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 15
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss1/15
05_FINAL.OLDFATHER 08.23.01.DOC 9/7/2001  11:14 AM 
2001] OTHER BAD ACTS EVIDENCE 175 
in which a court is to ask only whether the evidence is relevant—
judged by similarity in time, location, or modus operandi—and, if it is 
relevant, to assess whether it is unduly prejudicial.  This skips any 
consideration of which exception to the general rule applies and, 
as such, results in a rule that, at its core, amounts to the Ames rule, 
slightly embellished by the procedural trappings of Spreigl and 
Billstrom.  It certainly would result in the evisceration of the 
common scheme or plan exception, since Billstrom clearly 
contemplated that a showing of similarity in time, location, or 
modus operandi is less than what is required to establish a common 
scheme or plan.106 
Potentially taking things even a step further, in State v. 
Frisinger,107 the court stated the reason for the similarity rule as 
being “that the closer the relationship, the greater is the relevance 
or probative value of the evidence and the lesser is the likelihood 
that the evidence will be used for an improper purpose.”108  This 
formulation appears even to omit the need for any separate 
prejudice analysis and comes dangerously close to saying that the 
entirety of the other bad acts analysis boils down to an assessment 
of whether the other act is close in time, location or modus 
operandi. 
E.  A Long Look Back 
The century in bad acts evidence law in Minnesota began with 
a pair of cases setting forth nearly diametrically opposed views of 
the generally-applicable rule.  Fitchette contains perhaps the most 
restrictive (in terms of admissibility) statement of the rule the court 
has ever articulated, while Ames—issued less than a year later by the 
very same court—contains perhaps the most permissive.  This 
beginning foreshadowed all that was to follow in the century.  Both 
versions of the rule enjoyed periods of predominance, though for 
most of the century the stated standard was some version of the 
Fitchette rule.  At no point, however, did either version of the rule 
 
from the improper admission of other-crime evidence, we take this opportunity to 
review the circumstances where other-crime evidence may be admitted.”  Bolte, 530 
N.W.2d at 196.  The court’s otherwise thorough and detailed summary glosses 
over the categorization portion of the two-step inquiry, devoting most of its 
attention to the relevance requirement. 
 106. 276 Minn. at 178, 149 N.W.2d at 284. 
 107. 484 N.W.2d 27 (Minn. 1992). 
 108. Id. at 31. 
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completely vanish. 
Given the adoption of Rule 404(b), it would be difficult to 
argue that Ames is still good law.  Nonetheless, one can trace an 
unbroken line of precedent all the way back to either Ames or 
Fitchette.  The court has never expressly disavowed any of its 
significant decisions relating to bad acts evidence, preferring for 
the most part simply not to acknowledge contrary authority in its 
opinions.  Even now, when 404(b) seemingly mandates a 
moderated version of Fitchette, the court via cases such as Cogshell 
and Frisinger has at least occasionally articulated a rule that in 
operation is very near to the approach of Ames. 
To the lawyer or judge looking to analyze the potential 
admissibility of bad acts evidence, there are two consequences of 
this history.  First, because the court has never disavowed any 
portion of its case law, and because it has from time to time 
reached back to its older cases to extract language and principles, 
there are artifacts of that older law that appear along side, yet are 
inconsistent with, doctrines of more recent vintage.  The most 
obvious of these is the notion that, in cases of questionable 
admissibility, the defendant is to be given the benefit of the doubt 
and the evidence excluded.  The concept first appeared in Fitchette, 
was emphasized in Spreigl, and has appeared in opinions of the 
court as recently as 1999.109  Yet, it is often placed near a statement 
emphasizing the trial judge’s considerable discretion in 
determining whether bad acts evidence is admissible and 
emphasizing that the defendant “bears the burden of showing the 
error.”110  It is difficult to imagine how the benefit of the doubt can 
operate consistent with such a grant of discretion and it is apparent 
from the cases that its effect, if any, must be narrow.111  Indeed, it is 
difficult to believe that Fitchette, in which the presumption was first 
articulated, would be resolved the same way under the current 
abuse of discretion standard.  This is just one example of the 
contradictory threads in the doctrine, which have multiplied as the 
court has implemented the Billstrom rules, such that the law has 
become increasingly complex in addition to unsettled. 
The second consequence is that there is precedent for virtually 
 
 109. See State v. Lynch, 590 N.W.2d 75, 80 (Minn. 1999). 
 110. See id.; State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998). 
 111. See State v. Cogshell, 538 N.W.2d 120, 124 (Minn. 1995) (upholding 
admission of evidence despite the court’s express acknowledgment that the issue 
was close and other judges might have ruled the other way). 
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anything.  It is possible, based on cases of relatively recent vintage, 
for an advocate to make a strong argument for or against the 
admissibility of a broad range of bad acts evidence.  Indeed, an 
examination of the briefs submitted on behalf of the state and the 
defense in any given case concerning bad acts evidence would likely 
reveal reliance on two largely distinct bodies of law, such that the 
parties are talking past one another as much as focusing on a single 
disputed point. 
This article takes no position regarding the merits of any 
particular strand of precedent or the results in any of these cases, 
nor regarding any rule that could be extracted from those results.112  
Instead, the article’s purpose is to attempt to assess the body of law 
as a body of law; in other words, to consider the court’s statements 
of the law, how those statements have evolved over time, the 
existence of contradictions within that body of law, and the 
dissonance between at least some portions of what that body of law 
says and some of the results reached in the cases that comprise it.  
Rather than consider the much-analyzed question of how bad acts 
evidence ought to be used,113 I touch on even more examined 
questions related to the function of law.  More specifically, I 
consider whether, in light of the lengthy history of this body of law, 
the number of cases within it, and the inevitable internal tensions 
that have developed, it is possible for a new opinion on the subject 
to meaningfully fulfill the functions of a judicial opinion. 
III. PRECEDENT AND THE FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS 
This article now turns to consideration of two inextricably 
related subjects, namely, the functions of a judicial opinion and the 
doctrine of precedent, as well as the related matter of the attributes 
of a judicial opinion that fulfills these functions.  This discussion 
serves as a prelude to a subsequent analysis of the systemic factors 
that influenced the development of bad acts evidence law in 
Minnesota to its current state.  As the preceding Part 
 
 112. Which, under a minimalist conception of the doctrine of precedent, 
would be the true rule by which bad acts evidence is assessed.  See infra text 
accompanying note 129. 
 113. See, e.g., David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, “Other Crimes” Evidence in Sex 
Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529 (1994); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Using a 
Contextual Construction to Resolve the Dispute over the Meaning of the Term “Plan” in 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 1005 (1995); Thomas J. Reed, 
Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender 
Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127 (1993). 
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demonstrated, that state is one of doctrinal muddle, such that the 
entire body of law needs thorough reconsideration.  This Part also 
serves as a foundation for the later argument that it would be 
appropriate for this reconsideration to take place in the context of 
a single opinion, rather than incrementally.  I focus on three 
commonly-offered justifications for the practice of issuing written 
opinions: that judicial opinions are necessary to maintain the 
legitimacy of the judicial branch, to provide guidance to future 
actors, and to help ensure that similarly situated persons receive 
similar treatment.114 
The value of opinions in furthering the legitimacy of the 
judiciary stems from the fact that courts operate largely outside the 
public eye.  In contrast to the more political branches, the 
questions considered by the judiciary are almost uniformly discrete 
and of little immediate concern to anyone but the parties involved.  
In light of this, written opinions serve the goal of legitimacy in two 
ways.  First, they make the court’s reasoning public, thereby 
furthering the processes enumerated in the preceding 
paragraph.115  Second, and less obviously, they encourage the 
author to reason more carefully toward a conclusion.  The process 
of justifying a decision may lead the judge to determine that her 
initial conclusions need modification.116  Thus opinions serve not 
 
 114. These justifications can be further refined.  See HENRY M. HART, JR. & 
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW 568-69 (Willam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) 
(articulating twelve distinct reasons for adhering to prior holdings). 
 115. “One of the few ways we have to justify our power to decide matters 
important to our fellow citizens is to explain why we decide as we do.”  Patricia M. 
Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1371, 1372 (1995).  See also Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the 
Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81, 111 (2000) (noting “the value of transparency in 
judicial decisionmaking”). 
 116. See, e.g., PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 31 (1976) 
(“[c]onclusions easily reached without setting down the reasons sometimes 
undergo revision when the decider sets out to justify the decision.”).  Two 
developments, both products of the explosive growth in appellate court caseloads 
over the past forty years, have combined to make this feature of opinions less true 
than it once was.  The first is the rise of the law clerk, such that many if not most 
opinions are written by law clerks and merely edited by judges.  See RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 139-57 (1996) [hereinafter 
POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS].  Thus, judges, and the public, have lost the benefit of 
the reasoning that accompanies the writing process.  Editing does not stimulate 
the same critical impulses and the law clerks who draft the opinions may lack the 
breadth of knowledge or the confidence to point out difficulties to their judge.  
The second is the rise of the unpublished and often nonprecedential opinion, 
which is typically less carefully-crafted than its published counterpart and often 
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only to expose the court’s reasoning process, but to enhance it. 
Even so, the issuance of a written opinion may do little to 
achieve the legitimacy goal in any given case.  A court wishing to 
avoid a result seemingly compelled by strict adherence to the law 
has many devices available to enable it to do so.117  In most cases, 
only the parties to the litigation are likely to know of the avoidance 
and only the disadvantaged party is likely to care.  Yet, over time, 
the individual cases coalesce into a body of law.  Certainly in this 
broader sense, individual opinions, which are the only source of 
the stated reasons for the doctrines espoused in that body of law, 
are important both to facilitate the operation of the system of 
checks and balances118 and, at a more remote level, to maintain 
public confidence in the judicial system.119 
The advisory function of opinions is self-evident.  Regardless of 
whether one believes that the law is merely a prediction of what 
judges will do,120 it is of great practical importance to be able to 
make such a prediction.  To private parties structuring their affairs 
with an eye toward avoiding litigation, and to litigants and trial 
court judges looking to resolve a dispute in accordance with the 
law, a clearly-written appellate opinion that speaks to the question 
at hand is a welcome thing.  Even an opinion addressing a related 
question can be useful so long as one can extract from that opinion 
 
subject to even less scrutiny by the judge.  See John P. Borger & Chad M. 
Oldfather, Anastasoff v. United States and the Debate Over Unpublished Opinions, 36 
TORT & INS. L.J., 899, 903 (2001). 
 117. See, e.g., POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 116, at 165 (“the 
unpublished opinion provides a temptation for judges to shove difficult issues 
under the rug in cases where a one-liner would be too blatant an evasion of 
judicial duty.”); Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. 
& PROC. 219, 223 (1999) (noting that the device of unpublished opinions allow a 
court to avoid strict adherence to the law by “sweeping the difficulties under the 
rug”). 
 118. See ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 4 (1961) (noting 
that the written opinion “serves as a check upon the judiciary under our system of 
checks and balances in a polity in which so many legal questions are political and 
so many political questions are legal.”). 
 119. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is 
confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial system that is the 
true backbone of the rule of law.”); id. at 157-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the public’s confidence in the courts “is a vitally necessary ingredient of any 
successful effort to protect basic liberty and, indeed, the rule of law itself.”). 
 120. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 
(1897) (“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more 
pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”).  For a general discussion of prediction 
theory, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 221-28 
(1990)[hereinafter POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE]. 
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the principles at operation and do so in a form that makes it 
apparent how and why they might apply to the new situation. 
The third justification, which is closely related to the first two, 
is that written opinions do a good deal to further the fairness of the 
system.  Fairness is one of the central tenets of our judicial system, a 
goal often expressed in the maxim that like cases be treated alike.121  
Though there is plenty of room for disagreement over the level of 
generality at which cases are regarded as sufficiently similar to 
receive the same treatment,122 and probably even over what it 
means for cases to be treated alike, there is, nonetheless, near-
universal agreement that the manner in which the law is applied 
ought not to depend on legally irrelevant particulars of the parties 
before the court.  The written opinion, in both the individual case 
and as part of the body of law, serves as a vehicle for courts to 
demonstrate that there is some content to this notion.123 
Essential to the working of all of these functions is the idea of 
precedent.124  Conceptually, the notion of precedent is easy to 
understand—courts, in deciding a current case, are constrained by 
their decisions in prior cases.  Where a court has before answered a 
question one way, it cannot—absent some very compelling 
reason—later answer that question another way.  A recent case 
highlighting the requirements of precedent is Anastasoff v. United 
States,125 in which a panel of the Eighth Circuit held itself bound to 
follow the decision of an earlier panel that a statutory mailbox rule 
did not apply to claims for federal income tax refunds.126  Thus it 
 
 121. See, e.g., Jones v. Mabry, 723 F.2d 590, 596 (8th Cir. 1983) (“A fundamental 
duty of courts of justice is to decide like cases alike. . . .”). 
 122. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 595-97 (1987). 
 123. See Price, supra note 115, at 111; Wald, supra note 115, at 1372 (observing 
that written opinions serve “to demonstrate our recognition that under a 
government of laws, ordinary people have a right to expect that the law will apply 
to all citizens alike.”). 
 124. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 63 (1988) 
(“As a symbolic matter, disregard of what precedent courts say, if widely engaged 
in, would imply less than full respect for courts by courts, an attitude hardly 
calculated to instill respect for courts by others.”); Price, supra note 115, at 111 
(“[T]he only way a court can know that it is treating like cases alike is through the 
discipline of a doctrine of precedent.”). 
 125. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(en banc). 
 126. Id. at 905 (holding itself constrained by Christie v. United States, No. 91-
2375 MN (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992)).  Anastasoff was noteworthy because it held that 
the “judicial power” created in Article III of the United States Constitution was 
inherently limited by the doctrine of precedent, such that Eighth Circuit Rule 
28A(i), which deems the court’s unpublished opinions to be nonprecedential, was 
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declined to reconsider the prior decision despite an intervening 
case in which the Second Circuit reached the opposite 
conclusion.127  Had the court concluded otherwise, the functions of 
judicial opinions would not have been served.  Similarly-situated 
parties would not have been treated alike, the ability to structure 
one’s affairs in certain compliance with law would have been 
reduced, and, in consequence, public confidence in the judiciary 
and the law would have decreased.  The net effect of any given 
opinion on these global concerns is, of course, quite small and, 
accordingly, can, in any particular case, be trumped by other 
concerns, such as for adopting the better rule of law.  In any event, 
while the implications of the doctrine of precedent are clear in a 
case like Anastasoff, in which the question decided in the first case is 
identical in all material respects to the question presented in the 
second, things quickly become murky as differences appear 
between the authority and the case under decision. 
Prevailing conceptions of the binding force of precedent have 
varied throughout American history.128  Even today there is 
tremendous disagreement on this point.  Some advocate a 
minimalist view of the doctrine, under which only the court’s 
decision “measured by the precise adjudicative facts that give rise to 
the rule of the case,” and not the reasoning behind that decision, 
has the force of law.129  This view holds that an opinion generates 
law only to the extent that it assigns consequences to a specific set 
of facts, with principles of law emerging only after a number of 
 
unconstitutional.  223 F.3d at 900.  See generally Borger & Oldfather, supra note 
116. 
 127. Weisbart v. Unites States, Dep’t of Treasury, No. 99-6134, 2000 WL 
1041231, at *1 (2d Cir. July 28, 2000). 
 128. See Price, supra note 115, at 107-15. 
 129. See, e.g., RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 10 (1990) [hereinafter 
ALDISERT, OPINION].  Professor Schauer has suggested that this is the only possible 
meaning of precedent: 
If precedent is seen as a rule directing a decisionmaker to take prior 
decisions into account, then it follows that a pure argument from 
precedent, unlike an argument from experience, depends only on the 
results of those decisions, and not on the validity of the reasons 
supporting those results. . . .  If precedent matters, a prior decision now 
believed erroneous still affects the current decision simply because it is 
prior. 
Schauer, supra note 122, at 576.  His later work suggests that he might also 
acknowledge that a rule of precedent could direct a decisionmaker to follow the 
reasons supporting a prior decision, that is to say its mode of analysis, without 
regard to the validity of those reasons.  See Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1469-70 (1995). 
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similar cases have been decided.130  At the other end of the 
spectrum are those who assign significance not only to the 
reasoning exhibited in a court’s opinion, but also to the specific 
language used to express that reasoning.131 
Both views are problematic.  Under the minimalist view the 
doctrine has little content.  If all that matters are the facts and the 
result reached on those facts, with everything else in an opinion 
amounting only to dicta, then it is entirely too easy to distinguish 
nearly every prior case.  As a result, once one discards all or even 
most of a court’s characterization of its decision, the notion of 
being bound by precedent loses almost all of its meaning.132  On 
the other hand, a conception of precedent under which courts are 
bound not only by the result and the reasoning of prior courts, but 
also the language in which that reasoning is portrayed, does too 
much.  Courts hear individual cases, each presenting but a single 
version of all the situations that could possibly arise.  The danger of 
placing too much emphasis on an earlier court’s characterization 
of the rule it applied is that the earlier court cannot be expected to 
have thought through all of the possible variations that might arise, 
and so could inadvertently bind a later court to a result that not 
even the first court would have reached.133  Though a definitive 
formulation of the law may be appropriate in the later stages of a 
doctrine’s development, where a court will have developed enough 
experience to have a feel for the difficult areas and a perspective 
on how best to address them, too much emphasis on early opinions 
could easily result in the later court having to reach results the 
initial court would not have reached had the situation been 
presented. 
What happens in practice is not a consistent application of any 
view of the scope of the doctrine of precedent.  Lawyers and judges 
 
 130. See ALDISERT, OPINION, supra note 129, at 29-30.  See also Danny J. Boggs & 
Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions and the Nature of Precedent, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 
17, 24 (2000). 
 131. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don’t Cite This! Why We 
Don’t Allow Citation to Unpublished Dispositions, CAL. LAWYER, June 2000, at 44 
(expressing the view that for an opinion to constitute precedent, the judges on the 
panel must “subscribe not merely to the result but also to the phrasing of the 
disposition.”). 
 132. See EISENBERG, supra note 124, at 53. 
 133. See Schauer, supra note 122, at 579-80 (noting that a decision 
“accompanied by an articulated and authoritative characterization of the decision 
and its underlying facts” creates a hurdle to a subsequent decisionmaker inclined 
to decide a case differently). 
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move from one approach to the next as it suits their purpose, 
minimizing the value of unfavorable cases while lauding every 
aspect of opinions that support the position they advocate or the 
holding they intend to reach.134  Strict application of the minimalist 
view is rare.135  Moreover, neither the bench nor the bar regards 
each decision from a given court as of equal precedential value 
with every other opinion of that court.  Instead, an opinion’s 
persuasive value varies with a number of factors, including the 
identity of its author, whether the court was unanimous and, if not, 
what was said in dissent, and the intrinsic quality of the opinion, 
which itself is assessed by such criteria as the authority relied on 
and the extent to which it gives the appearance that the court 
thoroughly considered the issue at hand.136  Even professed 
minimalists acknowledge “[t]he brute fact . . . that not all 
precedent represents currency of equal value.”137 
There are problems associated with a system based on 
precedent aside from its malleability.  A by-product, if not a 
justification, for the use of precedent is that it creates an economy 
in the judicial task.138  Judges need not reinvent the wheel by 
reasoning from first principles in every case.  The big questions will 
almost always have been answered before, allowing the judge to 
focus her attention on the narrow problems presented in a given 
case.  Most of the time this works exactly as intended—but not 
always.  By encouraging unquestioned reliance on what courts have 
done in the past—even if courts appear to have done the same 
thing many times—precedent can lead to a failure to consider what 
ought to be disputable points.  It is not so much that many new 
cases call for the reconsideration of the larger issues, but that a 
failure to give due consideration to the larger issues can lead to an 
incomplete analysis of the smaller problem at hand.  As the 
separation between the particulars of the precedent and the case at 
hand increases, so does the danger that a court simply concluding 
itself to be bound by precedent is substituting a label in place of 
thoughtful consideration of whether the differences between cases 
are meaningful in light of the reasons and policies behind the legal 
 
 134. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 66-69 (1951); Wald, supra note 
115, at 1399-1403. 
 135. EISENBERG, supra note 124, at 53. 
 136. See, e.g., Walter V. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 
(1966). 
 137. ALDISERT, OPINION, supra note 129, at 112. 
 138. Schauer, supra note 122, at 599. 
33
Oldfather: Other Bad Acts and the Failure of Precedent
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
05_FINAL.OLDFATHER 08.23.01.DOC 9/7/2001  11:14 AM 
184 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:1 
rule to be applied.  As Judge Posner has put it, the writer becomes 
so caught up in the task of marshaling authority for the conclusion 
he wishes to reach that he fails to give full consideration to the 
meaning of the legal principles at issue.139  The result can be an 
opinion replete with citations to authority, all of which “disguise 
the fact that no reasons have in reality been given for a particular 
judgment.”140 
A variant on this problem arises in the context of dicta.  It is 
easy for a lawyer or a judge to dismiss language from a prior 
opinion as dicta, further consideration of which is thereby 
rendered unnecessary.  But this practice, too, tends to eviscerate 
the concept of precedent, because it is merely the other side of the 
minimalist view, under which nearly every case can be distinguished 
from those that have come before.  Moreover, to dismiss something 
as dicta is to sweep it away by labeling it rather than by confronting 
it.  Language does not make it into an opinion by accident.  At least 
one judge, and possibly a panel of judges, thought about that 
language, intentionally placed it in the opinion and meant for it to 
have some effect in the context of a particular sort of case.  It is 
legitimate for a later court to conclude that portions of a prior 
opinion are inapplicable because the earlier court clearly did not 
have a certain wrinkle in mind.  It is not legitimate simply to say 
that the language is dicta and refuse to consider it with no further 
justification.  The difference between these two approaches is 
rarely more than a couple of sentences in an opinion.  Those 
sentences, however, are critical to that opinion’s legitimacy. 
A final danger that accompanies reliance on precedent is that 
there can be too much of it.  Once a body of law grows to a certain 
size it becomes inconvenient to cite to, let alone consider, all of the 
cases that ought properly to be viewed as precedent.141  At some 
point the system of precedent breaks down simply because it is not 
 
 139. See Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles and Do They Matter?, 62 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1421, 1441-42, 1447(1995).  The effect is similar to that arising from an 
unthinking dependence on metaphor.  See Chad M. Oldfather, The Hidden Ball: A 
Substantive Critique of Baseball Metaphors in Judicial Opinions, 27 CONN. L. REV. 17, 29-
30 (1994). 
 140. RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 196 (2d ed. 1968). 
 141. See, e.g., John J. O’Connell, A Dissertation on Judicial Opinions, 23 TEMP. 
L.Q. 13, 14 (1949) (tracing the perceived problem of too much law to as far back 
as 1831 and noting the consistent requests by members of the bar for limitations 
on publication).  This concern initially motivated requests for courts not to issue 
published opinions in all of their cases, most of which originated with members of 
the bar who were having difficulty keeping abreast of the law. 
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realistically possible for courts or litigants to factor all relevant prior 
decisions into the analysis of any current case.  When that point is 
reached, the inevitable result is that, whether viewed in terms of 
their results or their rationale, cases are not consistently decided.142 
None of this is meant to suggest anything but that the doctrine 
of precedent has its shortcomings and that for judicial opinions to 
serve their purposes—in both the individual case and as constituent 
parts of a body of law—these limitations must be taken into 
account.  As noted above, a meaningful doctrine of precedent is 
essential for judicial opinions to serve the functions for which they 
were designed.  Yet the doctrine of precedent itself depends on the 
issuance of written opinions.143  If the courts that issue those 
opinions succumb to the dangers just outlined, however, the 
concept of precedent becomes meaningless.  The way out of these 
difficulties is to take a flexible approach to precedent, where the 
focus is not so much on how broad the binding portion of a prior 
opinion ought to be, but rather on the extent to which any portion 
of it is binding.  Under this view precedent constitutes a starting 
point, “a presumptive but not an absolute constraint on what courts 
may do.”144  Ideally, 
a determination of what rule a precedent stands for 
typically involves consideration not only of the intent of 
the precedent court, as revealed by its language taken in 
context, but also professional discourse concerning the 
precedent, changes in social propositions and in doctrine 
after the precedent was decided, and the judgment of the 
deciding court concerning what rule would be most 
socially congruent and systematically consistent.  
Accordingly, the role of a deciding court in determining 
what rule a precedent stands for is not so much to 
determine what the precedent was intended to stand for 
as to determine what it has or will come to stand for.145 
This, of course, entails a good deal of mindfulness on the part 
 
 142. CROSS, supra note 140, at 196 (“The result of [the] failure to cite [all 
relevant cases] is a goodly number, if not a plethora, of cases in conflict or near 
conflict with each other.”). 
 143. James Boyd White, What’s an Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1366 
(1995)(“[T]he invocation of the past as authority . . . seems to require the 
existence of the judicial opinion, or something like it.”). 
 144. Price, supra note 115, at 86 (characterizing this concept of precedent as 
that embodied in Article III of the United States Constitution). 
 145. EISENBERG, supra note 124, at 52.  Interestingly, Professor Eisenberg 
characterizes this as a description of how precedent operates in actual practice.  Id. 
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of courts, not only in the way they go about deciding cases, but 
more importantly (for purposes of this article), in the way they 
justify their decisions.  Though some contend that there is little 
relation between the style and the quality of a judicial opinion,146 
certain approaches to the task do appear to lend themselves more 
readily to opinions that convey an awareness of these limitations.  
Judge Posner, for example, prefers what he terms the “impure” 
style.147  The author of such an opinion forswears the impersonality 
and formality of the traditional judicial opinion, instead writing as 
if he were “explaining to a hypothetical audience of laypersons why 
the case is being decided in the way that it is.”148  Rather than 
engaging in the formalist fiction that the “right” answers to the 
questions presented in a case can always “be resolved by the 
straightforward application of settled principles,”149 or that opinions 
ought to at least look as though that is all the court is doing,150 the 
pragmatist judge attempts only to reach “the most reasonable result 
in the circumstances, with due regard for such systematic 
constraints on the freewheeling employment of ‘reason’ as the 
need to maintain continuity with previous decisions and respect the 
limitations that the language and discernible purposes of 
constitutional and statutory texts impose on the interpreter.”151 
As Professor Giradeau Spann has put it, this sort of opinion 
acknowledges that “[l]egal doctrines do not simply exist; they exist 
for a purpose.”152  What he terms a “functional analysis” makes it 
easier to assess the persuasiveness of a given opinion, in turn 
facilitating a healthy debate over the merits of both the result and 
 
 146. Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1466 
(1995). 
Insofar as there is a standard of good judicial reasoning, and insofar as it 
is undesirable to hide bad judicial reasoning, it is far from clear that the 
characteristics of judicial opinions nowadays castigated are any more 
likely to facilitate such deception than are the characteristics celebrated 
by the contemporary critics. 
Id. 
 147. See Posner, supra note 139, at 1429-30. 
 148. Id. at 1430. 
 149. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 147 
(1996). 
 150. See Schaefer, supra note 136.  “Although an opinion may be born only 
after deep travail and may be the result of a very modest degree of conviction, it is 
usually written in terms of ultimate certainty.”  Id. at 9. 
 151. Posner, supra note 139, at 1432-33. 
 152. Girardeau A. Spann, Functional Analysis of the Plain Error Rule, 71 GEO. L. J. 
945, 979 (1983). 
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the form and content of the analysis leading to that result.153  
Opinions that justify their results through little more than 
references to ostensibly controlling precedent, in contrast, stifle 
debate by creating an unjustified aura of inevitability to decisions 
that, in reality, were the product of considerable discretion.154  Even 
worse, where an opinion fails to describe why the policies behind 
the rules compel their application in that case, the judicial act 
appears to be based on instinct as much as on reason.  Though 
instinct is undoubtedly an element of many, if not most, judicial 
decisions,155 reason is supposed to be at the core of the system.  
Opinions ought to demonstrate that the process was undertaken in 
a manner consistent with that core value. 
IV. ASSESSING THE LAW OF BAD ACTS EVIDENCE 
As discussed in Part II, the law relating to bad acts evidence in 
Minnesota suffers from a number of the problems of a large body 
of law.  The Minnesota Supreme Court has never disavowed any of 
its case law.  Yet an examination of that law reveals two distinct and 
fundamentally conflicting lines of precedent dating back to the 
beginning of the century.  Only rarely has the court acknowledged 
this conflict and its embrace of either line has always been 
incomplete at best.  Furthermore, over time, the law has naturally 
drifted away from its starting place, taken on new emphases, and 
acquired new elements.156  As this law has developed and become 
 
 153. See id. at 979-82. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See generally RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: READINGS, 
MATERIALS, AND CASES 374-88 (1976) [hereinafter ALDISERT, JUDICIAL PROCESS]. 
 156. The primary explanation for this doctrinal drift is simply that it is an 
inherent by-product of lawmaking via the common law method.  See POSNER, 
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 120.  “[A] series of small steps can add up to a giant 
stride, and although on the one hand moving incrementally gives judges a chance 
to stop as soon as experience demonstrates the error of their ways, on the other 
hand it may conceal from them the magnitude of the change they are 
cumulatively effecting.”  Id. at 292.  See also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE 
COMMON LAW 5 (Mark Dewolfe Howe ed., 1963).  This effect can be magnified in 
the criminal context, where the equities of the situation generally make it not only 
easier, but more palatable in a “rough justice” sense, to affirm a conviction, 
thereby leading to an increasingly permissive approach to the admission of bad 
acts evidence.  In addition, even if this permissiveness is not completely reflected 
in the language of opinions, the results of the cases may nonetheless signal a more 
permissive approach, just as most motorists’ experience is that the official, posted 
speed limit is not the effective speed limit. 
  There may also be other factors at work that are more specific to 
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more doctrinally complex, additional internal inconsistencies have 
arisen as artifacts from the older case law are carried over into the 
newer cases.157  Moreover, as is inevitable in any body of law so 
large, even apart from doctrinal conflicts, the results reached in the 
cases cannot all be squared with one another.158 
This part measures the law of bad acts evidence in Minnesota 
against the criteria considered in Part III.  In particular, it focuses 
on the likelihood that a judicial opinion crafted in the traditional 
style and utilizing the tools provided can meaningfully fulfill the 
functions that opinions are designed to serve.  It concludes that, 
given the inherent demands of the doctrine of precedent and the 
dangers that stem from that doctrine, it is nearly impossible for an 
opinion to resolve a single dispute by reference merely to existing 
Minnesota bad acts caselaw.  It next proposes that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court can consistently achieve the appropriate systemic 
goals only following a large-scale reconsideration of the 
 
Minnesota.  The Minnesota Supreme Court, for example, assigns opinions before 
cases are decided.  In the view of one jurist, this practice “has the unfortunate 
tendency to encourage individual judges in a multi-judge court to concentrate 
only on the cases assigned to them and, conversely, to give too much deference, 
consciously or unconsciously, to the judge who has been assigned the opinion.  
This is a fertile field for a one-person opinion to emerge from a multi-judge 
court.”  ALDISERT, OPINION, supra note 129, at 34.  My review of the court’s cases in 
the course of researching this article suggests, on at least an impressionistic level, 
that individual members of the court often have a preferred way of stating the 
applicable standards, which are often inconsistent, in emphasis or otherwise, with 
other justices’ formulations.  This, in turn, is at least in part the result of the need 
for collegiality, which prevents members of the court from an overly detailed 
critique of other members’ opinions.  See also Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives 
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 350-51 (1974) (discussing the 
institutional constraints under which the Supreme Court operates); Schaefer, 
supra note 136, at 9-10. 
  A final consideration is that many, if not most, of the court’s opinions on 
the subject are issued in first-degree murder cases.  See, e.g., State v. Shannon, 583 
N.W.2d 579 (Minn. 1998); State v. Dewald, 464 N.W.2d 500 (Minn. 1991); State v. 
Eling, 355 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. 1984).  The court must accept review of these cases. 
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 29.02, subd. 1.  As a result, it is likely that they do not present 
the issues as well as other cases might.  Since the court issues frequent opinions on 
the subject, however, it is probably less likely to accept discretionary review of 
those cases that present the issues well.  Beyond that, because there is such an 
extensive body of law and apparent precedent speaking to nearly every question 
that might arise, it will be a rare case that invites fundamental reconsideration of 
the doctrine. 
 157. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11. 
 158. See CROSS, supra note 140, at 96 (noting the tendency toward conflicting 
decisions).  This effect would undoubtedly be magnified were one to include 
opinions of the Minnesota Court of Appeals in the analysis. 
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admissibility of bad acts evidence.  Though any such 
reconsideration would necessarily be constrained by the provisions 
of Rule 404(b), there nonetheless remains considerable room for 
the court to reconceptualize and streamline its approach and, 
more importantly, to articulate the objectives the law is intended to 
achieve. 
1.  Bad Acts Law and the Function of Opinions 
Given the present characteristics of the body of bad acts 
evidence law in Minnesota, it is difficult for a traditional judicial 
opinion working with that law to fulfill the functions that opinions 
are designed to serve.  This is not to imply any sort of improper 
motivation on the part of judges.  It is simply that the traditional 
model of a judicial opinion calls for the analysis to be guided by 
precedent and for an explication of that analysis to be supported by 
a recitation of that authority, ideally in such a manner as to give the 
conclusion an aura of inevitability.159  Where there are doctrinal 
tensions and conflicting precedents, however, the traditional 
model requires judges to choose between precedents and to elevate 
some aspects of doctrine over others and it encourages them to do 
so without acknowledgement.  The processes of deciding and 
justifying a decision, though related, are distinct and many jurists 
candidly admit that there is often a disconnect between the factors 
utilized in the former process and those articulated in the latter.160  
But even where the judge intends complete identity between what 
was considered and what is stated, where precedent is unsettled, an 
opinion that purports to resolve a case largely by reference to 
precedent will fail to serve its intended purposes.  The law of bad 
acts evidence as it presently stands in Minnesota is especially 
susceptible to such failures. 
The fundamental problem is that there is too much law, both 
in terms of the number of opinions already part of the body of law 
and the amount and degree of variation in the characterizations of 
the rules within that body of law.  As Part II demonstrated, there 
are individual cases that are difficult to square with one another 
and, more significantly, there are aspects of the stated rules that are 
 
 159. See Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles, supra note 139, at 1439-42 (critiquing an 
opinion written pursuant to the traditional model). 
 160. See ALDISERT, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 155, at 464; KARL N. 
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 56 (1960). 
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difficult to square with one another.  The situation is such that, in 
nearly any case involving bad acts evidence, both the defense and 
the prosecution can craft what in a vacuum appear to be strong 
arguments for their respective positions and do so using cases that 
are in all respects “good law.”  In part, this is an inherent feature of 
the law’s subject matter.  There are few easy cases.  Because bad 
acts evidence is nearly always relevant and nearly always prejudicial, 
many cases will appear to fall close to the line.  Rather than 
excusing doctrinal opacity, however, this underscores the need for 
a clear expression of the factors to be considered. 
For the most part, however, these problems stem from the 
court’s failure to ever completely cast its lot with either Fichette or 
Ames.  Because there are coexisting lines of precedent supporting 
fundamentally opposed approaches, any opinion that justifies its 
conclusion through the traditional means of marshaling authority 
in support of a result will necessarily fail to fulfill the functions of 
judicial opinions.  Any result entails disregarding precedent, 
whether through distinguishing it or simply choosing not to 
mention it.  This phenomenon was especially apparent in the early 
part of the century as Fitchette and Ames themselves cycled in and 
out of favor.  Though less evident in today’s more nuanced body of 
law, shades of it inhere in the uncertainty regarding the standards 
applicable to identity evidence. 
In similar fashion, because there are internal tensions in the 
common articulations of the applicable rules, any result requires a 
court to elevate certain aspects of the rule over others.  The best 
example of this comes in the conflict between the notion that 
defendants are to be given the benefit of the doubt when it comes 
to admissibility and the notions that trial courts have broad 
discretion on the same point and the defendant bears the burden 
of demonstrating that that discretion was abused.161  Because 
precedent—whether viewed as the results of previous cases, as the 
rules announced in previous cases, or something in between—is 
critical to the proper functioning of judicial opinions, and because 
precedent cannot be fully honored in these circumstances, the 
traditional opinion cannot do its job.  There is not merely a 
danger, but a near certainty that like cases will not be treated alike.  
Each new case exacerbates this problem by adding another opinion 
to the conflicting lines of precedent, thereby decreasing the extent 
 
 161. See supra text accompanying note 109-111. 
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to which judges and lawyers can predict the result in the next case. 
2.  The Need for a Dramatic Remedy 
Holmes described the development of the law as follows: 
The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish 
a rule or a formula.  In the course of centuries the 
custom, belief, or necessity disappears but the rule 
remains.  The reason which gave rise to the rule has been 
forgotten, and ingenious minds set themselves to inquire 
how it is to be accounted for.  Some ground of policy is 
thought of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it 
with the present state of things; and then the rule adapts 
itself to the new reasons which have been found for it, and 
enters on a new career.  The old form receives new 
content, and in time even the form modifies itself to fit 
the meaning which it has received.162 
In the case of bad acts evidence, it is not so much that the 
reasons underlying the rules have changed.  To be sure, social 
science research may have advanced our understanding of the 
validity of the assumptions behind the general prohibition against 
the admission of bad acts evidence, which relate not only to 
criminal behavior but also to jurors’ behavior, to the point where 
the rules ought to account for these advances.163  But the bigger 
problem is that the court has never ultimately determined the 
proper content of the applicable rules.  This makes “adjusting” 
them a difficult proposition. 
Holmes’ conception of the law suggests that the doctrinal 
kinks will work themselves out over time.  Under this view, the cases 
will eventually trend in one direction, with continual 
reexamination of the rules in the unending series of cases leading 
ultimately to doctrinal equilibrium.  History suggests, however, that 
an incremental approach to change will not succeed in the context 
of bad acts evidence.  The law has remained unsettled for at least a 
century.  During that time, the court, or at least individual justices 
writing on behalf of the court, has attempted to clarify the law on a 
 
 162. HOLMES, supra note 156, at 8. 
 163. E.g., Rochelle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting 
Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 37 (1985) (examining the relationship between introduction of bad acts 
evidence, rates of conviction, and credibility of witnesses). 
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number of occasions.  Each of these attempts has largely been 
ignored or at least not treated as a watershed.  Even those opinions 
that resulted in legitimate reform—especially Billstrom and Spreigl—
have seen much of the clarity they brought to the law drifted over 
by the blizzard of subsequent opinions.  Moreover, in simply 
creating overlays to the existing doctrine, rather than reconsidering 
the issue from the ground up, Spreigl and Billstrom may well have 
engendered as many doctrinal difficulties as they solved. 
Though these phenomena are likely to be present to some 
degree in any body of law in which the issues are frequently 
litigated, the nature of bad acts evidence may make it especially 
fertile ground for the cultivation of unsettled doctrine.  It is easy in 
the abstract to understand both why bad acts evidence is relevant 
and why it is extremely prejudicial.  It is not always easy in the 
context of an individual case to resolve these conflicting concerns.  
But in at least some portion of the cases, either relevance or 
prejudice clearly dominates the equation.  In justifying these 
cases—particularly those where prejudice clearly outweighs 
relevance—it may be tempting to make statements of principle that 
become inconvenient when the opposite dynamic appears.  The 
result is not an elegant jurisprudence.  Because the cases continue 
to require choices between two divergent objectives, the likelihood 
of incremental adjudication leading to a consistent body of law is 
small. 
Moreover, because the existing body of law is so vast, the 
likelihood that any new case will present what appears to be a novel 
situation, let alone raise questions that invite doctrinal 
reconsideration at a fundamental level, is slight.  Even if the court 
were to attempt to effect a thorough reconsideration of its 
jurisprudence incrementally, the present anonymity of many of its 
past opinions that read as though they were meant to put the law 
on a different course suggests that an incremental approach is 
likely to fail.  In addition, any true reconsideration would 
necessarily signal much of what a comprehensive rethinking would 
entail.  The only workable way out of the current confusion and 
inconsistency is for the court to engage in a deliberate, top-to-
bottom reconsideration of the law relating to bad acts evidence, 
constrained only by the terms of Rule 404(b).164 
 
 164. This is nowhere near as significant a constraint as might first appear.  The 
rule speaks in broad terms, and is thereby subject to a broad range of reasonable 
interpretations.  Indeed, the federal courts have interpreted the nearly-identical 
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The focus of the inquiry should be to generate a definitive 
statement of the instrumental goals that are to guide application of 
the rule, with formulation of more specific rules by which those 
goals are to be implemented as only a secondary concern.  
Something approaching a complex set of rules has been, and may 
continue to be, appropriate in the context of other crimes 
evidence.165  But absent a structure that requires, or at least 
encourages, resort to guiding principles in the application of the 
rules, a complex structure may simply encourage or enable a paint-
by-numbers approach that results in the same systemic problems 
that characterize bad acts law today.166  Especially in light of the 
inevitable pull toward affirmance that arises from the facts of nearly 
all bad acts cases, precommitment to a rule and a manner of 
application based on a largely dispassionate consideration of the 
policies at play can only enhance the integrity of the law going 
forward by ensuring that courts give due consideration to these 
policies in subsequent cases. 
Beyond the mere practical need for clarity of approach, such 
an opinion would be consistent with—or at least not inconsistent 
with—the court’s role and nowhere near as radical a step as it 
might first appear.  Courts’ responsibility for making law, though 
tied to the resolution of concrete disputes, is not limited by it.167  
Consistent with this, the Minnesota Supreme Court has regularly 
exercised its supervisory powers to create prospective requirements 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) in a manner considerably different from the Minnesota 
court’s interpretation of Minn. R. Evid. 404(b).  E.g., United States v. LeCompte, 
99 F.3d 274, 277-79 (8th Cir. 1996) (evincing more rigid interpretations of the 
scope of the exceptions); United States v. Gessa, 971 F.2d 1257, 1261-62 (6th Cir. 
1992) (en banc) (holding that the determination of whether proposed bad acts 
evidence falls within the scope of an exception is a legal determination). 
 165. See Schauer, supra note 129, at 1470 (arguing that lengthy and complex 
opinions may be necessary given the present judicial structure, and that “it may be 
appropriate to think of opinion writing as (at least in part) a conscious process of 
rule making.”). 
 166. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles, supra note 139, at 1439-41 (disparaging multi-
factor tests as enabling a court to clothe a decision in an often unwarranted cloak 
of certainty). 
 167. See EISENBERG, supra note 124, at 4-5 (“Our society has an enormous 
demand for legal rules that private actors can live, plan, and settle by.  The 
legislature cannot adequately satisfy this demand. . . .  Accordingly, it is socially 
desirable that the courts should act to enrich the supply of legal rules . . . by 
attaching much greater emphasis to the establishment of legal rules than would be 
necessary if courts’ sole function were the resolution of disputes.”).  But see 
ALDISERT, OPINION, supra note 129, at 9 (“Announcing a rule of law of the case is 
nothing but a byproduct of the court’s adjudicative function.”). 
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and otherwise address issues outside the narrow scope of the 
dispute before it.168  Because this is a mature body of law, at least in 
the sense that the courts have a broad range of experience with the 
possible factual scenarios that may arise, the court need not be 
concerned that it would formulate a rule that history would reveal 
to be ill-advised.169  In similar fashion, there exists a broad range of 
materials beyond its own past cases for the court to draw on in its 
consideration.170  Many of the arguments against a global 
 
 168. See State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1984) aff’d 620 N.W.2d 706 
(Minn. 2001) (establishing, pursuant to its “supervisory power to ensure the fair 
administration of justice,” a requirement that all custodial interrogations be 
electronically recorded).  See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 
1.5(i) (3d ed. 2000) (discussing rulings related to the supervisory authority of 
courts); Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial 
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1887 (2001) (considering generally the 
applicability of justiciability principles to state courts and noting specifically that 
“the standard critique of judicial activism . . . does not apply to state courts.”). 
 169. The court could further reduce the likelihood of this happening by 
emphasizing that the focus of courts’ consideration is to be on the rules 
articulated in the case as illuminated by the overarching policy concerns 
motivating those rules and by expressly providing that, in precedential terms, the 
opinion is intended to constitute a firm, but not wholly inflexible, starting point 
for analysis. 
 170. Though I cannot claim to have the sort of “ingenious mind” necessary 
under Holmes’ description to account for what the rule ought to be, I nonetheless 
offer the following non-exhaustive list of points that ought to be taken into 
account in any global reconsideration.  (1) It is widely acknowledged to be fiction 
to suppose that juries will use bad acts evidence, once admitted, for only the 
limited purpose for which it is offered.  That this is so creates the potential for 
broad disparities of result between similarly situated defendants, based entirely on 
the trial judge’s decision whether to admit bad acts evidence.  (2)  How should 
juries be instructed regarding the use of bad acts evidence?  Despite the significant 
similarities between Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) and Minn. R. Evid. 404(b), the required 
instructions under the two rules are widely divergent.  Compare 10 STEPHEN E. 
FORESTELL, MINNESOTA PRACTICE 30 (1999) (Minnesota pattern jury instruction) 
with JUDICIAL COMMITTEE ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 33-37 (2000) (Eighth Circuit pattern 
jury instruction).  (3) Preventing the conviction of innocent defendants is 
generally acknowledged to be one of the central goals of our criminal justice 
system.  See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.4(e) (3d ed. 2000).  
Yet current law provides for no meaningful appellate review of the sufficiency of 
evidence supporting criminal convictions.  See Jon O. Newman, Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 993-97 (1993).  At least one judge has linked this 
conundrum to the use of bad acts evidence, suggesting that a rule of greater 
admissibility would be appropriate so long as it was coupled with more searching 
sufficiency review.  See id.  (4) As a general matter, the stated law relating to bad 
acts evidence in Minnesota is strikingly different from the standards set forth in at 
least one treatise on the law of evidence.  See generally 1 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190 (1999).  Though Minnesota may not be alone in 
that respect, see David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, “Other Crimes” Evidence in Sex 
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reconsideration of the rule, such as that to do so would upset 
settled expectations, are simply not present here.  Such an opinion, 
then, would be nothing more than a grander version of the sort of 
“brush-clearing” opinion issued by courts all the time.171 
Finally, it is not insignificant that bad acts evidence is used 
almost exclusively in the criminal context.  Fairness, or at least the 
appearance of fairness, is one of the criminal justice system’s 
cornerstone values.172  A system that places great discretion in trial 
court judges without providing clear or consistent guidance 
concerning how that discretion is to be exercised virtually ensures 
that similarly situated persons will be subject to disparate 
treatment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court opened the twentieth century 
with a pair of cases articulating diametrically opposed approaches 
 
Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 540-56 (1994) (discussing courts’ application of 
various 404(b) exceptions), and though there are certainly strong arguments to be 
made in favor of jettisoning any special standard relating to such evidence, see id. 
at 560-65, this disconnect ought not to go unremarked upon.  (5) The present law 
places significant emphasis on the discretion of the trial court.  Great appellate 
deference to this discretion seems highly inconsistent with the notion that the 
defendant is to be given the benefit of the doubt if the question of admissibility is 
close; there appears no way around the conclusion that it is the trial judge’s 
decision to admit that will be given the benefit of the doubt.  (6) Discretion is not 
a concept that provides its own content.  To say that a decision is committed to the 
discretion of the trial court means different things in different situations.  See 
Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 754-55 (1982).  
Any reformulation ought to strive to articulate the contours of this discretion, 
including in particular whether it extends only to the decision to admit evidence 
found to fall within one of the 404(b) exceptions or also to the question of 
whether the evidence falls within an exception.  See generally United States v. Gessa, 
971 F.2d 1257 (6th Cir. 1992)(en banc) (holding that the determination of 
whether proposed bad acts evidence falls within the scope of an exception is a 
legal determination).  (7) At least some of the rationale underlying the Fitchette 
form of the rule of general exclusion had to do with the unfairness inherent in 
making a defendant defend himself against other crimes with little or no notice.  
At least some of this unfairness was alleviated by the notice requirements of Spreigl 
and Billstrom.  To the extent that this unfairness was a significant reason for the 
general exclusion, a more relaxed approach is more appropriate. 
 171. See Wald, supra note 115, at 1405 (discussing the rhetoric of opinions 
dispelling with conflicting and confusing precedent). 
 172. See Charles Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of 
Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1195-96 (1979) (suggesting that the appearance, 
rather than the practice, of fairness may be the primary aim of the criminal justice 
system). 
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to the admissibility of bad acts evidence.  Since then, the court has 
drifted between these extremes, never fully adopting one approach 
or the other and never repudiating any of its case law.  This 
dynamic, coupled with the addition of requirements that have 
made the doctrine more complex, has produced a body of law 
replete with the inconsistencies both among and within the cases 
that constitute it.  This, in turn, renders the notion of precedent 
meaningless, such that an opinion written in the traditional fashion 
can no longer speak with authority.  Further, because the court’s 
past attempts of incremental clarification have either failed or 
worsened the problems, the only way for the court to relegitimize 
this body of law is for it to fully reconsider the entire problem in 
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